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THE LIABILI'l'Y OF THE AGENT OF AN UNDISCLOSED OR PARTIALLY 
DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL 
by 
Gary K. Sambol" 
Introduction 
When an agent, acting within the scope of his authority 
on behalf of a principal, enters into a contract with a third 
party, the agent is usually not liable to the third party for 
the contract's performance . 1 However, under certain 
circumstances, an agent may be liable as a party to the 
contract. The purpose of this article is to discuss the rules 
of agency law which determine the liability of an agent who 
acts within the scope of his authority. 2 In the first part of 
this article, · I present the general rules in the abstract. 
Next, I discuss the theoretical justifications for an<;i the 
theoretical difficulties with these rules. Specifically, I 
attempt to point out the theoretical difficulties which arise 
when these rules are applied to cases where an agent 
negotiates a contract on behalf of a business which, 
unbeknownst to the third party, is owned by someone other than 
the agent, or if owned by the agent, is incorporated. I 
suggest that, in such cases, agent liability may result even 
where it is not a fair conclusion that the third party or the 
agent manifested an intent for the agent to be liable or that 
the third party relied on the liability of the agent. 
Finally, I discuss an approach found in a few cases which 
denies agent liability whe.re it is not a fair conclusion that 
the third party dealt with the agent as an individual, rather 
than as an agent, or relied on his individual liability. 
General Rules 
Whether an agent is liable as a party to a contract made 
• Lecturer, Rutgers University School of Business - Camden and 
Rutgers University School of Law - camden. I wish to thank 
Sherrie L. Gibble and Jay M. Feinman for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
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on behalf of a principal essentially depends upon the 
agreement between the agent and the third party. 1 However, in 
determining whether the agent and the third party intended for 
the agent to be liable, courts apply certain rules of agency 
law which are as follows. While the third party has the 
initial burden of showing that the agent made a contractual 
promise, 4 the agent, to avoid liability, must establish that, 
at the time that the contract was made, the third party had 
notice that the agent was acting in a representative capacity 
as well as notice of the principal's identity.s Where the 
third party has notice of the fact of agency and of the 
identity of the principal, the principal is said to be 
"disclosed". 6 In such a case, the agent is not personally 
liable unless, of course, the third party can establish that 
there was nonetheless an agreement for the agent to be 
liable.7 Where the third party is without notice of the fact 
of agency, the principal is said to be uundisclosed". 8 In 
this situation, the agent is liable as a party to the 
contract. 9 Where the third party has notice that the agent is 
or may be acting in a representative capacity, but is without 
notice of the identity of the principal, the principal is said 
to be "partially disclosed., • 10 The agent of a partially 
disclosed principal is presumptively liable as a party to the 
contract. That is, the agent is liable unless he can 
establish that there was a mutual intention that he not be 
liable. 11 
To illustrate these rules, consider the hypothetical case 
of Arnold Agent, an interior decorator who is hired by his 
client, Polly Principal, to purchase an oriental rug on her 
behalf. First, suppose that Arnold orders the rug and that, 
at the time of the order, he tells the seller that he is 
acting as an agent on behalf of Polly Principal. Because the 
seller has notice of the fact of agency as well as notice of 
the identity of the principal, the principal is disclosed and 
Arnold is presumptively not liable for the contract. Suppose 
now that Arnold orders the rug in his own name without 
indicating that he is purchasing the rug as an agent of 
another. Because in this case, the seller is without notice 
that Arnold is acting in a representative capacity, the 
principal is undisclosed and Arnold is liable as a party to 
the contract. Finally, suppose that Arnold tells the seller 
that he is purchasing the rug for "a client" without informing 
her of the name of the client. Because here, the principal is 
only partially disclosed, Arnold is presumptively liable as a 
party to the contract. 12 
Theoretical Considerations 
Underlying the liability of the agent of an undisclosed 
principal is the assumption that, without notice of the 
existence of the principal, the third party obviously intends 
to deal with the agent as an individual, not as an agent. 13 
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In other words, the third party intends for the agent to be 
liable as the ostensible principal. t 4 Underlying the 
presumptive liability of the agent of a partially disclosed 
principal is the assumption that, without notice of the 
identity of the principal, the third party is probably 
unwilling to rely solely on the credit of the unknown 
and therefore inte'?ds for the agent to be personally 
as well. IS Moreover, lt has been explained that it mav 
also be presumed that the agent agrees to be 
Finally, the liability of the agent of an undisclosed or 
partially disclosed principal has been justified on the basis 
that an agent can easily avoid liability simply by disclosing, 
at the time of the contract, the existence and identity of the 
principal. 17 
In the above hypothetical examples involving an 
undisclosed and a partially disclosed principal, the liability 
of the agent makes sense in terms of the probable intent of 
the parties. That is, in the example where Arnold's principal 
is undisclosed, the seller has no reason to believe that 
Arnold is acting on behalf of anyone but himself and thus 
obviously intends for Arnold to be liable as the ostensible 
principal. In the example where Arnold simply indicates that 
he is purchasing the rug for "a client", it is also a fair 
inference that, without notice of the name of the client, the 
seller is relying on Arnold as a party to the contract. In 
addition, in either example, it is probably a fair conclusion 
that Arnold agrees to be liable. 
While in the above hypothetical examples, the rules 
determining the liability of an authorized agent are rather 
straightforward, they present a number of theoretical 
difficulties in certain cases. To illustrate, consider the 
cases of Saco Dairy Co. v. Norton13 and Judith Garden; Inc. v. 
Mapel. 19 In Saco Dairy, the manager of the "Breakwater 
Court11 , a hotel owned by his mother, was held liable for dairy 
goods that he had ordered for the hotel even though all bills 
were in the name of the hotel and the plaintiff never charged 
the manager personally until the hotel failed to make payment. 
On appeal, the manager argued that his use of the hotel's name 
in ordering the goods was notice of the fact of agency and of 
the identity of the principal to relieve him of personal 
liability for the contract. In rejecting the manager's 
argument, the higher court explained that " ( t) he fact that the 
defendant was operating the business of a hotel under the name 
of 'Breakwater Court' was at least as consistent with the fact 
that he was the proprietor as that he was the manager for 
anotheru. 20 Therefore, the court refused to disturb the lower 
court's finding that the manager acted as the agent of an 
undisclosed principal. 21 
In Judith Garden, the court held the operator of "The 
Gazebo11 , an incorporated retail store, liable for an oral 
contract that she had negotiated to purchase certain 
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merchandise for the store. Even though the plaintiff itself 
was an incorporated retail store similar to "The Gazebo", 22 
the court concluded that the defendant acted as the agent of 
an undisclosed principal because, at the time of the contract, 
she did not make the plaintiff aware that "The Gazebo" was a 
trade name used by a corporation rather than a trade name 
under which she did business as an individual proprietor. 23 
The court explained that it is the burden of the party seeking 
to avoid personal lia.bility to disclose the fact of agency and 
the name of the principal and that " [ i] t is not ·a tenable 
defense to urge that the other party had the means to discover 
this. u2.4 The significance of the corporate status of the 
business is, of course, that a corporation is generally 
recognized as an entity which is legally distinct from its 
owners, the Thus, unlike a sole proprietor 
who is personally liable for contractual obligations incurred 
in operating her business, 26 or a general partner who is 
personally liable for the contractual obligations of the 
partnership, rr a shareholder, as a general rule, is not 
personally liable for the contractual obligations of the 
corporation. 28 However, as illustrated by Judith Garden, a 
shareholder who negotiates a contract on behalf of a 
corporation acts as an agent of the corporation and thus, may 
become a party to the contract under agency 
Saco Dairy and Judith Garden are typical of cases where 
the third party was aware that the agent was acting on 
account of some business, but the agent could not show that, 
at the time that the contract was made, the ·third party had 
reason to know that the business was owned by someone other 
than the alfent, 30 or if owned by the agent, was 
incorporated. In such cases, most courts have held, as in 
Saco Dairy and Judith Garden, that an agent's use of the 
principal's trade name in negotiating a contract is not, at 
least as a matter of law, sufficient notice of the fact of 
agency and of the identity of the principal to relieve the 
agent of liability. n Thus, in cases like Saco Dairy and 
Judith Garden , where the principal's trade name and other 
circumstances surrounding the contract are consistent with the 
possibility that the agent is the real principal in interest, 
the agent must make known, at the time of the contract, who 
the actual proprietor of the business is, and in the case of 
an incorporated business, that the business is incorporated. 
Otherwise, the principal may be deemed undisclosed and the 
agent liable as the ostensible principa1. 33 Alternatively, 
the agent may be liable as the agent of a partially disclosed 
principal on the theory that although the third party has 
notice that the agent is or may be acting in a representative 
capacity, the "true" principal is not disclosed or, at least, 
not sufficiently disclosed. 34 It is important to note that, 
under the specific circumstances of a case, the use of the 
principal's trade name may be sufficient notice of the 
existence and identity of the principal. 35 However, where the 
third party has no reason to know that the business on whose 
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account the agent is acting is something other than a sole 
proprietorship owned by the agent or perhaps a partnership in 
which the agent is a partner, the agent be liable as a matter of law. 36 
Where the third party knows that the agent is acting on 
account of a business and the business is identified by some 
to say that the principal is undisclosed or partially 
dJ.sclosed presents several theoretical difficulties. The 
first theoretical difficulty concerns the assumption implicit 
in cases like Saco Dairy and Judith Garden that at the time 
the contract, the third party intended for agent to be 
In this regard, it is obviously not always a fair 
1nference that, in entering into a contract like the one in 
Saco Dairy or that in Judith Garden, the third party assumes 
that the agent is personally doing business as an individual 
p:oprietor or partner. and thus intends for the agent to be 
lJ.able. For example, the absence of some representation by 
the defendant or other circumstances suggesting that the 
defendant actually owned the "Breakwater Court", is it really 
a fair inference that the plaintiff in Saco Dairy assumed that 
it was dealing with the defendant as an individual?37 
Similarly, in Judith Garden, given that the plaintiff itself 
an incorporated business, is it really a fair 
that the president, who negotiated the 
contract, assumed that "The Gazebo" was not incorporated? 
Isn't it more likely that she simply did not know one way or 
the other how "The Gazebo" was organized? Moreover in a 
case like Judith Garden, where a third party enters into a 
contract with a business without any reason to know and 
without inquiring into the status of the business or that of 
the agent, doesn't she really agree to a contract with the 
business, whoever the owner of the business is and whether the 
business is incorporated or not, and not with the agent as an 
individual? 
The second theoretical difficulty concerns the intent of 
the agent. Under traditional contract principles, the basis 
for contract liability is one's objective manifestations of 
However, can it be said that, in a case like saco 
Dairy or Judith Garden, the agent manifests his assent to be 
That is.' contracts negotiated by agents 
only the trade name are commonplace, if not 
usual. Therefore, it can hardly be said that in ordering the 
dairy goods in the name of the "Breakwater court" or in 
purchasing merchandise in the name of "The Gazebo", the 
def7ndants in . Saco Dairy and .Judith Garden., respectively, 
man1fested the1r assent to be l1able. Yet in each case the 
plaintiff was able to recover against the 'defendant. ' 
The third theore t i cal difficulty involves the concern 
that, under the approach taken in Sa co Dairy and Judith 
Garden, a third party may recover against the agent even where 
it is unlikely that she relied on the individual liability of 
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the agent. In saco Dairy, for example, it is hardly likely 
that the ownership of the "Breakwater Court" was in any way 
material to the plaintiff's agreement to supply dairy goods to 
the hotel. The plaintiff made all bills out to the hotel and 
never charged the defendant personally until the hotel failed 
to make payment. In Judith Garden, where the plaintiff itself 
was an incorporated retail business similar to "The Gazebo" 
and whose president thus had good reason to suspect that "The 
Gazebo" might also. be incorporated, it is unlikely that, in 
agreeing to sell the merchandise .to "The Ga.zebo", the 
plaintiff relied on .the individual liability of the defendant. 
Yet, in each case, the plaintiff was a.ble to recover against 
the defendant. 39 
An Alternative Approach 
Although most courts have followed the approach 
illustrated by SacoDairy and Judith Garden, a few courts have 
denied agent liability even :the 
surrounding the contract were the 
that the agent was the real principal in interest. Consider, 
tor example, the cases of Hess v. Kennedy , 40 Rabinowi.tz . v. 
Zell41 and SWeitzer v. Whitehead. 42 In Hess, the 
purchased a dress from a department store owned by the sons of 
the defendant under the family naxue "Kennedy". The sale was 
made by a sales clerk, but in the presence of the defendant 
who apparently helped negotiate the contract. Subsequent to 
the sale, the plaintiff tried to return the dress at which 
time the defendant approved an exchange and directed an 
employee to take the dress back. the plaintiff 
unable to find another dress to her she brought su1t 
against the defendant for the return of the purchase price. 
The trial court concluded that the defendant held herself out 
as the principal and was therefore liable to the 
In reversing the trial court, the appellate court out 
that there was nothing in the record which showed that the 
defendant "did anything which was calculated to cause the 
'plaintiff to believe that she owned the store, other than to 
exercise the authority which is usually intrusted to the head 
of the sales department."44 The court also stated that 
[u)ndoubtedly, when the plaintiff entered this 
store for the purchase of the dress, she understood 
that she was dealing with the proprietor of the 
store, whoever that might be . . . • (and that) it 
certainly cannot be contended that the purchaser 
.•• can hold the salesman, or even the 
superintendent of the store ... as a party to the 
contract of sale, upon the theory that it is the 
duty of one left in charge of a store to disclose 
that he is an agent, and not the proprietor of the 
store.45 
In Rabinowitz, the same court that decided Hess refused 
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to hold an agent liable for a written ·contract that he had 
signed using only the trade name of his employer. In this 
case, the plaintiff had addressed a written offer to sell 
certain goods to "Eastern Leather Goods". The defendant zell 
an employee of an individual doing business under the 
name 11The Eastern Leather Specialty Company", then accepted 
the offer by signing the plaintiff's offer "The Eastern 
Leather Specialty ·company, D. H. Zell". In reversing the 
trial court's judgment holding the defendant personally 
liable, the appellate court explained that "it (was) evident 
that his signature was intended to show who the person was who 
signed for the person or persons operating under the trade 
name."46 The court further explained that 
[t]he plaintiff was dealing with the ' business house 
using the trade name referred to • . . . [and that) 
[ i) t is of no importance in this action against 
[the defendant) for goods sold that the plaintiff 
did not know who was trading under the trade name. 
His agreement was with the person or persons so 
trading. If I agree with "Billy, the oyster Man", 
and do not know his name, my contract is 
nonetheless with the person, whoever he is, 
conducting business under that name. 47 
Finally, c.onsider the case of Sweitzer v. Whitehead in 
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to bold two 
officers of a corporation liable for a contract that they had 
negotiated even though, at the time of the contract, the 
plaintiffs were not made aware of the corporate status of the 
defendants' business and during negotiations, one defendant 
referred to the other as his upartner" . In this case, the 
defendants, Land and Whitehead, entered into a contract on 
behalf of "Land-Whitehead Equipment company" to sell on a 
commission basis certain equipment owned by the plaintiffs. 
After the equipment went unsold and the plaintiffs discovered 
that some of the equipment was missing and the rest damaged, 
the plaintiffs brought. suit against the defendants 
individually as well as their corporate principal. The jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and the defendants moved 
for judgment n.o.v. In denying the defendants' motion, the 
lower court explained that "whether they acted as principals 
or agents for a disclosed principal was primarily a 
question for a jury and that there was sufficient evidence to 
sustain the jury's finding that •.• [the defendants) acted as 
and were understood by (the plaintiffs) to be acting as 
principals rather than agents. " 48 On appeal, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that j udg:ment n. o. v. should have been 
entered in favor of the defendants because the plaintiffs had 
notice that the defendants were acting in a representative 
capacity as well as notice of the principal's 
While purporting to apply agency law, the court supported 
its decision largely on the basis that the plaintiffs did not 
deal with the defendants as individuals or rely on their 
l.22 
individual liability. In this regard, the court noted that 
the plaintiffs had entrusted the defendants with their 
equipment without investigating the status of the defendants 
or that of "Land-Whitehead Equipment company", and that apart 
from the reference to Land as Whitehead's partner and the 
absence of an indication that their business was a 
corporation, there was no evidence which could justify the 
assumption that the plaintiffs dealt with the defendants as 
individuals rather than as agents of "Land-Whitehead Equipment 
Company" • 50 Thus , the court concluded that 11 [ t) o premise 
individual liability on the quantum of proof adduced by [the 
plaintiffs] would substitute conjecture and surmise for 
proof. " 51 
In each of these three cases, even though the 
circumstances surrounding the contract were consistent with 
the possibility that the agent was the real principal in 
interest, the agent was able to avoid personal liability. In 
terms of agency principles, perhaps the approach in these 
cases may be stated as follows. Where the third party knows 
that the agent is acting on account of a business and the 
business is identified by some name, although a trade name, 
the principal is disclosed and the agent, at least 
presumptively, not liable. This approach is a sensible one 
because it recognizes that in many informally arranged 
contracts, where a third party enters into the contract 
without sufficient reason to know and without inquiring into 
the status of the agent or that of the business on whose 
account the agent is acting, she essentially agrees to a 
contract with the business, whoever its owner is and whether 
or not it is incorporated, and not with the agent as an 
individual. conversely, it is usually not a fair inference 
that an agent, who uses the trade name of a business without 
indicating the name of the proprietor of or the corporate 
status of the business, agrees to be personally liable. 
Thus, under such circumstances, the third party should not be 
able to recover against the agent as an individual. 
Presumably, even under this alternative approach, where 
the third party can show that she dealt with the agent as an 
indi vidua 1 or re 1 ied on his individual 1 iabi 1 i ty, she may 
recover against the agent. However, in the absence of any 
prior dealings between the third party and the agent as an 
individual or of any representations by the agent 
unequivocally indicating that he is the real principal in 
interest, it is difficult to see how the third party can 
satisfy this burden. For example, in Sweitzer, the court 
concluded that evidence that the plaintiffs were not made 
aware of the corporate status of the defendants' business and 
that one defendant referred to the other as his "partner" was 
simply not sufficient to even raise a question for the jury as 
to "whether reliance was flaced on the individuals as such 
rather than the entity. ,s Even assuming that the third 
party can show that she dealt with the agent as an individual, 
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must her failure to inquire into the status of the agent and 
that of the business have been reasonable? That is, are there 
circumstances under which a third party has a duty to inquire? 
Thus, while the alternative approach avoids the theoretical 
difficulties arising under the approach taken in saco Dairy 
and Judith Garden, the approach is not without its own 
practical and difficulties. 
SUllllllary 
While., in the abstract, the rules imposing liability on 
the agent of an undisclosed or partially disclosed principal 
are fairly straightforward, they present a number of 
theoretical difficulties in cases where an agent negotiates a 
contract in the name of a business, which unbeknownst to the 
third party, is owned by someone else or is incorporated. 
Under the approach followed by most courts, the agent, in such 
cases, may be held liable as the agent of an undisclosed or 
partially disclosed principal. However, this approach is 
theoretically problematic because agent liability may result 
even though it is not a fair conclusion that the third party 
or the agent manifested an intent for the agent to be liable 
or that the third party relied on the individual liability of 
the agent. Under an alternative approach, the third party is 
unable to recover against the agent where it is not a fair 
conclusion that the third party dealt with the . agent as an 
individual or relied on his individual liability. Although 
this alternative approach avoids the theoretical difficulties 
arising under the majority approach, it is not without its own 
practical and theoretical difficulties. 
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THE SECRETS OF TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN 
EXISTING UNDERGRADUATE BUSINESS LAW COURSE 
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For most undergraduate law professors the inclusion of 
international business law on their syllabi has yet to be 
accomplished. Many professors confess t .hey know little about 
the subject and would not, in any event, know how to include 
this material in their current courses. This paper will 
attempt to show that international business is a very signif-
icant and timely topic and that, consequently, international 
business law is a very important and relevant subject. This 
paper will provide a format for bringing international 
business law into the undergraduate law curriculum so that 
even the most uninitiated professors in this area can success-
fUlly bring this topic in from "left field" and include it in 
their course coverage. 
Before World War II, the United States was a country 
consistently trying to improve its national economy with 
little regard economically towards the rest of the world. As 
the last fifty years have passed, this country and other 
nations have developed a complex web of international trading 
patterns for goods and services that has created the global 
marketplace that exists today. Whether it be singular export 
or import transactions or the mass movements of goods, ser-
vices, capital or technology across country borders, busi-
nesses around the world derive an ever-increasing percentage 
of their revenues from international transactions. 
Recognizing this state of affairs, universities, first 
gradually and now with an unprecedented fervor, are inter-
nationalizing their curricula. 2 While management, marketing, 
accounting and other traditional business courses have been 
the main beneficiaries of this infusion of international 
material, undergraduate law courses seem to have been modified 
only minimally in this direction. Yet the need and rewards of 
covering this material in greater depth is ever present. 
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